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The Official C.I.A. Manual of Trickery and Deception. By H.
Keith Melton, Robert Wallace and John Mulholland. New York,
NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-06-1725890. Bibliography. Notes. Index. Pp. 250. $24.99
This interesting book purports to reproduce a special manual for trickery
and deception written by one of the world's great magicians, John Mulholland, working under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency. This
contract was part of a super-secret program code-named MKULTRA that
was authorized in March 1953 by Allen Dulles, DCI. "The research
included clandestine acquisition of drugs, clinical testing on and experimentation with humans, some of whom were unaware of said testing, and
grant proposals and contracts with hospitals, companies, and individuals"
(p. 5). Supposedly "all of the program's reports and operational files on
the 'research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological
materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control
human behavior' were ordered destroyed by DCI Richard Helms in 1973"
(pp. 15–16). But somehow this manual on magic and deception survived,
only to be discovered many years later.
The introduction to the Mulholland volume is written by Melton and Wallace. It covers the MKULTRA activities and gives many examples of its
products, including a robust description of attempts to assassinate Fidel
Castro with "hallucinogenic sprays and cigars," "contaminated boots,"
"depilatory, poisoned and exploding cigars," "exploding seashells," a
"contaminated diving suit," and a "poisoned pen" (pp. 12–13).
Their lengthy introductory chapter contains a mini-history of the art of
deception during the Cold War, primarily against the Soviet Union, and is
complete with interesting diagrams of items such as a CIA Escape and
Evasion Rectal Suppository, Gary Power's silver dollar that had a secret
pen inside for committing suicide, the gas tank in a car that was half-filled
with a compartment for smuggling persons, and spy coins that have secret
compartments for carrying microdots, or cipher books.
It reports that Mulholland was hired in 1956 to think about "the application of the magician's techniques to clandestine operations, such techniques to include surreptitious delivery of materials, deceptive
movements and actions to cover normally prohibited activities, influencing choices and perceptions of other persons, various forms of disguise;
covert signaling systems, etc." (p. 15).
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The heart of the book is a reproduction of the manual written by Mulholland. It has a section with "general comments" on deception and then follows with instruction on how to drop tablets or powders into the drink of
the target person. It also coaches on techniques for "removal of objects,"
e.g., how to take things without being noticed. There also is an interesting
set of observations about women, and how they must act differently.
One of my favorite sections is the overview, which contains some great
quotations such as: "successful deception depends so much on attitude of
mind" (p. 69) and "it takes practice to tell a convincing lie" (p. 69). So
much of the technique of deception depends on practice, and use of very
common movements, combined with urgent attention to doing anything
at all that anyone will take note of. "A person who seems to be interested
in what it is he is doing will not be noticed, but one whose interest is
directed toward what others are doing will attract attention" (p. 83). "[H]e
should be so normal in manner, and his actions so natural, that nothing
about him excites suspicion...[H]e has to be himself—as he is at his calmest moments...be comfortably natural or, at least, to give that appearance"
(p. 85). Another gem: "When the mind has been deceived, it is almost
impossible to work backward and discover the deception" (p. 88). There is
no need to give away all of the secrets of the book, but some of the coverage includes how to drop a pill from a matchbook while appearing to light
the target's cigarette, or dropping a pill from the side of a coin. There even
is coaching on the "exaggerated expression of dumbness" (p. 103). Powders are put into pencils under the eraser, and liquids are dispensed in a
variety of ways, including from a handkerchief. Instruction on how to
steal an important piece of paper and within the blink of an eye have it
folded six times and stuffed in a pocket without making any noise is
another part of the coverage.
What is amazing about Mulholland's manual is not so much the various
techniques of transporting things, such as having items hidden inside hollowed out coins, but instead the careful description he gives of the movements needed to use these various instruments. For example, there is a
six-step procedure for taking something away from a table right in front of
another person's eyes in a way that they will not notice it (pp. 154–155).
The manual ends with a section on recognition signals including tying
one's shoelaces in a unique way.
There is much more in the book than in this review, and if one is interested in the espionage training of a bygone era, this book is of great historical interest. The authors, Melton and Wallace, are experts in
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espionage and, judging from some of the rare and obscure references
listed in their notes, they have managed to get access to some very special
materials.
The foreword by John Mclaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, who also happens to be a magician, provides the overall
rationale for the project: "Just as a magician's methods must elude detection in front of a closely attentive audience, so an intelligence officer doing
espionage work must elude close surveillance and pass messages with
material without detection" (p. xii).
The only criticism I have concerns HarperCollins. It chose to use dreadful
paper stock for the book, which as a result looks like it is printed on grade
school drawing paper. I would not expect a long shelf life. Nevertheless, in
spite of this minor problem, this book is well worth purchasing and reading by anyone interested in this arcane corner of the espionage world.
Edward M. Roche, Henley-Putnam University
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The Counterterrorist Manual: A Practical Guide to Elite
International Units. Leroy Thompson. London, UK: Frontline
Books, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-84832-514-2. Photographs. Glossary.
Index. 256 pp. £19.99.
Leroy Thompson's latest book summarizes his previous works (over 30
books and 1,000 articles) in a handy reference guide to worldwide Counterterrorist (CT) forces. This basic textbook provides a history of CT units
around the world plus their methods for recruiting, selecting, and training
operators and their organization, weapons, missions, and tactics.
The author has been called knowledgeable and respected, and is a noted
expert on the subject of counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and VIP protection. His previous books cover combat knives, SWAT, bodyguard protection, specific historical US and UK commando units, counterinsurgency,
WWII and Cold War elite force histories, guns, uniforms, badges, and
insignias.
This book summarizes his previous books that go into more details about
specific units, weapons, and tactics. It collates information, giving a good
overview of the subject, and adds to the field by serving as a broad, singlevolume summary reference guide to international elite forces. The main
argument throughout the book points towards the continuing need for
elite forces to combat terrorist activities even in the smallest countries.
The special attraction of this book is its summary of information in one
volume, but it lacks details of each area. Although the book covers many
topics, it suffers from a lack of depth and detail that would make it a truly
comprehensive, analytical compendium of CT units. It spends too many
pages on vehicle delivery but only briefly mentions dignitary protection,
air marshals, and WMD. Since these areas are outside the direct subject of
this book and little information is included, these sections could have
been deleted, or reference to the author's previous works could have been
provided for more details. The author only references two of his previous
books in the suggested reading list.
This book would be of use to beginners in the CT field, for instructional
use, and for general orientation to international CT units, but only a reference guide for those seriously interested in the intelligence and CT profession. As such, it will supply the basic needs of those interested in this
subject and act as a good reference guide for professional office use, but
readers should look to other sources for the details required for professional CT analysis. Intelligence, CT, CI, HLS and protection professionals
should consult some of the author's previous writings and books for such
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details, even such details as may be found on Wikipedia. By looking up an
organization (e.g., GSG-9) or specific equipment (e.g., H&K MP5) on
Wikipedia, you'll find details of history, use, and specifications—much
more than in this reference book.
The first half of the book describes the history of worldwide CT organizations and their methods for recruiting, selecting, and training operators.
The second half of the book is devoted to weapons, equipment, missions,
and tactics. It includes a glossary of abbreviations and an index, both useful in reference material.
Chapter 1 outlines the terrorist incidents from the 1972 Munich Olympics
terrorist attack through the 1990s. It shows the history of why CT units
were created by almost every country in the world to protect citizens from
terrorist attacks in the future. Just like any game of cat and mouse, terrorists are always trying new ideas to thwart CT training and preparation.
The 9/11 attacks on the US were evidence of new and unanticipated
attacks to defeat the potential for CT forces to intercede and prevent the
completion of their missions.
Chapter 2 reveals the selection process in general and for a few specific
units. It describes the basics of finding, testing, and picking the "best of
the best" from existing military, paramilitary, and police forces. The outcome is selecting the most physically fit and highly motivated applicants
for the next phase—training.
Chapter 3 details the training regimen for a few specific units, describing
the CT operational phases, small unit tactics, modes of delivery (air, sea,
and land), and techniques for operations (surveillance, negotiation, intelligence collection), as well as the needed skills for successful operations
(communications, weapons expertise, combat techniques).
Chapter 4, the shortest chapter, briefly describes the basic organization of
CT units with some specifics on a half dozen or so of the most well known.
Although interesting, military organization doesn't seem as important or
detailed as other chapters.
Chapter 5 reviews the most frequently used types of weapons, primarily
guns, as well as surveillance and entry equipment and delivery vehicles. It
does not cover knives and other weapons, but does include almost five
pages on optical sights and twelve pages on vehicles.
The last chapter, Chapter 6, covers specific cases (hostage rescue, entry
into buildings, aircraft, trains, buses, and ships, dignitary protection,
73
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training exchanges), but has only a page dealing with Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD). It would have been more useful to spend a few pages
discussing the importance of elite forces in dealing with WMDs.
Overall, this book is a good historical reference work but only as an
overview of CT forces. It is well illustrated, describing the tools,
techniques, and procedures of global elite forces—not just the US—and is
a very helpful single reference volume for CT units. As a comprehensive
reference work on the subject, it is worth having it within easy reach on
your bookshelf.
John Coale, Henley-Putnam University
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An End to Al-Qaeda: Destroying Bin Laden's Jihad and
Restoring America's Honor. By Malcolm Nance. New York, NY:
St. Martin's Press, 2010. ISBN: 978-0-312-59249-3. Notes.
Index. 296 pages. $25.99 Hardcover.
An End to Al-Qaeda presents a thought-provoking discussion about AlQaeda (AQ), its leadership, intentions, and attempts to recruit members
in the ideological battlefield. It makes recommendations about engaging
AQ and its information operations in order to decrease its support and
undermine the group's efforts to dominate the debate about the evolution
and trajectory of Islam. The book draws on the author's expertise as a
counterterrorism (CT) officer and Arabic linguist, and his experience
studying AQ in the field, including in combat. Malcolm Nance uses his
twenty-eight years of experience in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia to craft recommendations and guidance for engaging and
defeating AQ in the psychological and ideological battle space.
Nance's book presents AQ as an organization seeking to take advantage of
the decline of American stature in the arena of world politics, which provides fodder for the group's information operations. According to Nance,
AQ and its leader, Usama bin Laden, have the advantage in the ideological
battle field, and it is up to America to change that. The book provides a
healthy critique of the Bush Administration's efforts to fight the "War on
Terror" and proposes steps to counter AQ's "cultish fringe" (p. 55) ideologues and win back the psychological and moral advantage. Nance's book
comes at a pivotal point in the development and growth of the field of CT.
He argues, quite compellingly, that there is a distinct spectrum within
Islam, and perceiving Islam as the enemy does more to fuel ibn Laden's
psychological warfare campaign than defeat it. This book offers a refreshing argument that Islam is not the enemy and that the efforts of some elements of the media to demonize it are compromising the attempts of US
counterterrorism strategists to reshape and reconstruct America's CT narrative. Although some of Nance's ideas and observations are not new to
the Intelligence and CT communities, he does offer a viewpoint supported
by decades of service in the field and a working knowledge of the Arabic
language, culture, and people.
Nance constructs the main argument for his book by first identifying the
problem of turning the tables on AQ in the ideological battle, then defines
and discusses the complexity of his thesis in context to the evolution of
Islam in a post 9/11 world. Finally, he provides strategies to resolve the
issues by proposing methods of fighting in the psychological theatre of
war. He offers real-world examples from his experience in the field which
help to add to his credibility as an author. An End to Al-Qaeda is a fast75
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moving, appealing read for those analysts and operators either new to the
field of CT or who have been in the field for less than a decade. Nance is
right to delineate AQ as unqualified to offer religious guidance and advice,
and he offers specific ideas and recommendations to fight the war of
ideas. The book grows in its sophistication as the chapters progress and
helps the reader to delve below surface arguments of the tired phrase,
"winning hearts and minds." Nance invigorates the debate within the CT
analytical community as to how much attention and effort should be paid
to the use of language and framing. Nance's book will be useful for those
CT analysts and operators working in the beginning to intermediate level
analysis of AQ because it does not necessarily provide any new academic
insights per se, but leads an important and relevant discussion into the
inner workings of AQ's psychological operations and the ideological
underpinnings of the members' arguments which influence recruitment
and sustainment efforts. The book does, however, help to correct the trajectory of some CT analysis which has gotten mired in the emotional and
subjective judgments of AQ and which does not help strategists tease out
the key problems which must be addressed in order to move forward.
The book does fall short in defining the "Muslim world" as diverse, both
in commitment to faith, worship, practice, tradition, and geographic
diversity, and how an ideological battle would tackle this diversity challenge. Nance argues the US must break AQ's links to Islam using several
strategies. For example, he recommends starting a "social epidemic of
rejection" by "revealing and hammering into the public consciousness the
ideological plan of the New Islamic Caliphate" (p. 227). However, there is
no monolithic Muslim population with which to implement this ideological plan. Muslims live in every corner of the world and have different life
experiences and relationships to their religion. From the secular Muslim
Turk to the Arab-American Shi'a beauty queen, Muslims vary in their
commitment and level of belief, just as members of any organized religion. It is practically impossible to institute a widespread public relations
campaign against a state-less organization and network such as AQ without addressing those public grievances that bind the scattered and diverse
Muslim population around the world together (in most cases), such as
Palestine, human rights, and the freedom for oppositional participation in
the political process. If Nance would supplement his argument with the
prerequisite foreign policy requirements prior to entering the ideological
battle space, his book would be rooted in a much stronger foundation and
his recommendations for separating AQ from the larger Muslim population of the world would have more merit. In many parts of the world vulnerable to AQ's messaging, actions speak louder than words. If a massive
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information operation is to take place to challenge AQ in the field of information warfare, the major foreign policy issues of concern must be kinetically addressed and not just verbally bantered about.
From a geopolitical perspective, Nance's book avoids discussing the nonideological opportunities to address America's standing in the world,
which is fundamental prior to beginning any ideological campaign efforts.
He does not bring forth the necessary and sufficient conditions which
must be changed before the target audience for ideological battle would
even be ready or open to receive a reformed narrative. These are the
issues of good governance; equal and fair political participation for opposition parties in the Arab world (as well as the non-Arab Islamic Republic
of Iran); economic growth and opportunity for minorities of Arab descent
in Israel; the creation of an independent, sovereign, and contiguous Palestinian state; and human rights in countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Iran. Part and parcel of fighting the ideological battle in the Arab and
non-Arab Middle East is having a receptive and willing audience; but the
perception of the US in many parts of the Arab and non-Arab world has
been severely damaged over the last decade. Europe and Asia are increasingly unhappy with US foreign policy and inflexibility on issues such as
Gaza, the separation barrier along the West Bank, freedom of speech in
Egypt, and women's rights in Saudi Arabia. Nance has excellent ideas for
the CT and Intelligence communities on attacking the ideological conflict,
but offers few recommendations for readying the field for battle.
An End to Al-Qaeda is a good read for those analysts in the CT community still developing their understanding of information operations and
understanding the role of religion in the battle between AQ and the rest of
the world's Muslims, but the reader must also be aware of the larger ties
that bind both Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such as a desire for good
governance, a sovereign and contiguous Palestinian state, and free and
fair elections throughout the larger Middle East and South Asia. Overall,
the book is worth buying; Nance captivates the reader with his experience
and personal connection to the Arab world and constructs an interesting
strategy for engaging AQ in the ideological battlefield. It would do the
reader well, however, to understand the foreign policy prerequisites
which must be in place before employing information operations to
amplify efforts to restructure the anti-AQ narrative.
Keely M. Fahoum, Henley-Putnam University
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God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of
Modern Jihad. By Charles Allen. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo
Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 2006. ISBN-13:
978-0-306-81522-5. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes.
Sources cited. Index. Pp xiv, 349. $16.15.
"Know your enemy as you know yourself and in a hundred battles you will
not be defeated!" That admonition written over two thousand years ago
by Sun Tzu is as timeless a truth as can be found amongst the body of
work left by all of history's great thinkers on strategy, operations, and tactics. So it holds true with the matter of combating modern 21st century
terrorism, and especially so with understanding the motivations of the
partisans of Al Qaeda and their fellow jihadists willing to commit the most
heinous acts ostensibly in the name of Islam. Historian Charles Allen has
provided an in-depth and scholarly look into the very roots of the ideology
that drives the modern day jihadists of Al Qaeda and their fellow extremists with this superb and accurately titled book.
Tracing the founding of the Wahhabi cult to a Sunni Muslim named
Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, who in the 1740s authored his Book of
Unity in which al-Wahhab rejected any innovation, interpreted the Quran
in a literalist way while tacitly ignoring a host of Quranic passages that
forbade harming the innocent, and committed those who would follow his
heretical teachings to the violent destruction of infidels, polytheists, and
unbelievers. Al-Wahhab included in his definition of those targeted for
destruction Christians, Jews, Shias, Sufis, and even mainstream Sunnis
who did not adopt his radical interpretation of the Quran. Al-Wahhab also
disregarded the Quran's oft repeated message of mercy, charity, tolerance, and compassion, essentially excising numerous Quranic passages to
justify his call for violent, uncompromising jihad.
The author goes on to chronicle the convergence of al-Wahhab and Wahhabism with the fortunes of the Royal House of Saud beginning with alWahhab's seeking refuge with Muhammad ibn-Saud in Nedj, having been
unceremoniously disowned by his own family as a heretic. Al-Wahhab
married a daughter of ibn-Saud, introduced firearms to Saud's warriors,
and indoctrinated them in his violent dogma. In their ongoing feud with
the Ottoman Turks who then controlled Arabia, the newly Wahhabist
warriors of ibn al-Saud resorted to the most violent tactics, including
mutilation and killing members of groups targeted by the dogma of Wahhabism. After siding with the British Empire against the Turks in World
War I, they ultimately gained control of Arabia for the House of Saud and
its chosen dogma of Wahhabism. Evolving in parallel in Northern India
was a no less radical school of Islam known as Deobandism. A reaction to
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the natural resentment of the indigenous people of the Indian subcontinent to the British Raj, Deobandism was a religious movement that led to
violent uprisings against British rule.
The Deobandi movement has solid Wahabbi roots dating back to the 19th
Century. It is no less violent or extreme in its dogma, and it is responsible
for Pakistan's network of 10,000 mudrassa that continue to turn out
thousands of young boys who are true believers in extremist interpretations of Islam. Under the reign of dictator General Zia ul-Haq, graduates
trained in Deobandi mudrassa flocked to fill posts in the Pakistani army,
secret service, and civil service bureaucracy. When the former Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan, it was Saudi oil money that funded the establishment of a recruitment and support system for the thousands of foreign
jihadists, many true believers in Wahhabism, who flocked to wage jihad
against the Red Army. It was this witch's cauldron of Saudi-funded Wahhabism, Pakistani-sanctioned Deobandism, and war against the Soviet
Union that forged Al Qaeda and its bloody cause of international jihad.
Allen meticulously traces the evolution of the Wahabbist cult and its partisans through the 20th Century including the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the eventual influence of Wahabbism on that radical Islamist
creation of Sayyid Qutb and his successors: his brother Muhammad Qutb
and the Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who later found sanctuary
from Egyptian persecution in Saudi Arabia. In the fullness of time, these
two radical Islamists would play a crucial role in the education and radicalization of none other than Usama bin Laden when the future head of Al
Qaeda enrolled as an undergraduate at King Abdul Aziz University at Jeddah. Ibn Laden would later reportedly be one of the first Saudis to fly to
Afghanistan to join the resistance to the Soviet invasion, encouraged by
Azzam, who would later follow him. Under Azzam's guidance, ibn Laden
honed his skills and his leadership abilities as part of what became the
highly sophisticated Maktab al-Khidamat an-Mujahedeen (Office of Services to the Mujahedeen), the logistical support network that assisted over
twenty five thousand foreign fighters in joining the fight against the Red
Army in Afghanistan, many of them coming from the most radical Islamic
organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Allen concludes this journey through heretical religious extremism by
chronicling the course of events in which Usama bin Laden traveled to
Afghanistan and reestablished his base of operations, creating a chillingly
efficient terrorist organization that would go on to perpetrate the attack
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Allen makes his case
in the final chapter that the Muslim umma is overwhelmingly composed
of honest men and women who wish only to live in peace and practice
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their faith, and are no more interested in world domination that Christian
evangelicals who preach their religion seeking to "save" the souls of others
not initiated in their particular faith. Allen justifiably asserts that extremists such as Usama bin Laden and groups such as the Taliban are an equal
threat to the majority of innocent Muslims as they are to the West. It is
this dedicated and responsible effort by the author to separate the
extremists from the majority—including those of the Deobandi community that has produced its share of honest Muslim leaders as well as having its violently radical elements embodied in the Ahl-i-Hadiths—which
renders this book so invaluable in guiding the reader in untangling and
understanding the physical and ideological alliances that characterize the
Islamic extremist movements.
This book should be essential reading for anyone who is seeking to understand the motivations and dogmas of the modern day jihadists and the
vulnerabilities imposed by their intellectually bankrupt ideology and selfaggrandizing agendas. This is especially true for law enforcement, military, and intelligence professionals working to come to grips with the
threat posed by this virulent religious cult that has established a bloody
record of violent terrorism and human rights violations wherever its
adherents hold sway, from the Middle East to Central Asia to the Peshawar Valley. God's Terrorists is the essential tool to lay a solid foundation
to "Know your enemy as you know yourself…" as Sun Tzu so astutely
advised over two millennia ago.
Leland Erickson, Henley-Putnam University
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Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and
Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East. Frederic
Wehrey, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold
D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, Jennifer Li. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-83304554-6. Maps. Figures. Notes. Tables. Pp xxviii, 202. $40.50.
Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of
Iranian Power in the Middle East is a RAND Corporation work completed under the auspices of PROJECT AIR FORCE. In keeping with
RAND publication standards, the scholarship and research are impeccable, and the conclusions offer practical applications for decision and policymakers grappling with ever-evolving strategic realities. The following
discussion encapsulates the salient concepts and ideas regarding Iranian
political and social developments as presented by the authors in this
work.
The U.S. and Iran have not had diplomatic relations since the Islamic
Revolution of 1979. Both countries have been in a stalemate, occasionally
advancing feeble initiatives that have gone nowhere. Tensions over the
U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with a desire to be the preeminent power in the Gulf, have resulted in Tehran's current muscle flexing to see how far it can push Washington without provoking open military conflict. As Iran perceives itself to be encircled, isolated, and without
any allies in an area it regards as its own neighborhood, its outward
behavior and its true intentions may send conflicting signals. Faced with
technologically superior U.S. airpower that it can not conventionally meet
head-on in its own backyard, Iran's bellicose rhetoric may choreograph a
basic desire for recognition and respect, which if not granted, may lead
Tehran to engage in asymmetric acts of aggression.
Iran's strategic culture is characterized by a combination of assertiveness
(intentions) and caution (capabilities). On the one hand, Tehran craves
respect both regionally and globally (intentions), and uses inflammatory
language to press its case for this stature. On the other hand, the Iranian
leadership also realizes in a Realpolitik sense that its true military and
political options are limited (capabilities). However, Iran still attempts to
advance its agenda in the region through cautious leveraging of influence
and behind the scenes use of terrorist groups. Iran's regional strategy
relies upon three principal factors: deterrence, support for Islamists and
non-state actors, and appeals to Arab public opinion. Deterrence has utility in both the psychological and military realms as long as push doesn't
come to shove. Support for Shi'ite and Sunni terrorist groups such as
Hizbollah and Hamas carries both political and symbolic value in terms of
81
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Tehran exhibiting its "pan-Islamic credentials" within the Middle East
and Muslim world. Flamboyant, direct appeals to Arab public opinion
modeled on the style of late Egyptian President Gamal 'Adb al-Nasr have
often fallen flat as Tehran perceives it has more influence than it really
does.
Because it cannot directly confront the U.S. in a conventional military
sense (although it would like to have that capability), Iran has dedicated
its time and resources to developing a robust asymmetric capacity and
doctrine. Conventional Iranian forces are mired in bureaucratic inertia,
partisan infighting, and, due to lack of procurement initiatives, obsolete,
poorly maintained equipment. In fact, Tehran's multi-layered and overlapping security apparatus is better positioned for internal security efforts
geared towards regime survival than defending the country from external
military threats. Iran's asymmetric capabilities are more potent, presenting a more threatening ability that emphasizes deterrence and guerrilla
warfare using the model Hizbollah has developed in Lebanon. In addition, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has an arsenal of
anti-ship mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, and "swarming" tactics to use
against superior naval forces in the geo-strategically important Strait of
Hormuz.
The Iranian military strategy focuses on (1) maintaining internal stability
and unity through use of military, intelligence, law enforcement, and
paramilitary forces; (2) employing exaggeration, ambiguity, and obfuscation to deter aggression from the U.S. and its regional allies; (3) in-depth
homeland defense to counter an invasion; and (4) using its armed forces
to extend its influence through intimidation, dissuasion, and coercion in
order to gain regional and global prestige.
Regarding Iran's interplay with terrorist, extremist, and dissident movements, Tehran perceives itself as more influential than it really is. The
Islamic Republic has supported and financed activities of Hizbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas in efforts to compensate for its
conventional inferiority. However, in the event of a conflict with the U.S.,
support from these groups is by no means a given, suggesting that Iran
exerts influence over these allies, but not control. During the early years
of the Islamic Republic, Tehran sought to export "Islamic Revolution" to
other countries. After watching the excesses of the Iranian Revolution
with horror, Muslim countries turned away from the Iranian model, seeking a more moderate approach to emulate.
The Arab world's perception of Iran does not necessarily match Tehran's.
Iran's direct appeals to the "Arab street" undermine some Arab govern82
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ments while also bypassing established diplomatic protocols. Gulf States
also mistrust Tehran's intentions towards non-Iranian Shi'ite populations. Arab states have a dual view of the Iranian nuclear program. On the
one hand, they fear Tehran's regional ambitions. On the other hand, they
endorse it as a critique of western "double standards." They also hope that
the U.S. will not view any Arab criticism of Iran's program as tacit
approval for a strike.
The book closes with a series of policy recommendations for the U.S.
Acknowledging that past efforts and a Cold War style containment policy
have failed, the authors recommend a new set of paradigms. One of the
recommendations is for the U.S. to bolster international sanctions and
financial pressure as a means of dissuading Iran's nuclear ambitions
while at the same time avoiding punitive measures that have little meaning or support. Another option advocates bi-lateral discussions to forge
common ties in areas of mutual concern such as the ongoing contingencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, narcotics trafficking, disaster relief, refugees, and humanitarian crises. Notably absent was a recommendation for
substantive discussions regarding terrorism. The last suggestion was to
have a multilateral regional security framework that includes Iran yet is
sensitive to Arab concerns.
Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of
Iranian Power in the Middle East is a valuable guide to better understand
Washington's strategic options vis-à-vis Tehran. It has merit for national
security strategists, Middle East specialists, policymakers, and decision
makers involved with long-term solutions to Gulf security paradigms. For
Iran watchers and specialists, it is a must-have for the library.
Mark J. Roberts, Transportation Security Administration
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They Dared Return: The Untold Story of Jewish Spies Behind
the Lines in Nazi Germany. By Patrick K. O'Donnell,
Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-306-818004. Photos, Appendices, Notes, Index, Pp. 240. $26.00
This historical account of the work accomplished by a few of the agents of
the Office of Strategic Services in World War II is sure to intrigue all readers interested in military history and especially World War II history.
Patrick K. O'Donnell has done a masterful job of recounting events which
had a vast impact, especially in Austria, in the closing days of the Nazi
Third Reich. Beyond the simple recounting of events there are lessons
that do not change for operatives over time, but sometimes do need to be
reinforced.
Patrick K. O'Donnell is an established military historian who has
authored five previous books. Among them are Beyond Valor (winner of
the William E. Colby Award), and the acclaimed account of the Battle of
Fallujah, We Were One. O'Donnell has long been interested in World War
II and has interviewed a large number of WWII veterans. Some eight
years prior to the publication of They Dared Return, he met Fredrick
Mayer. After extensive interviews with Mayer and his best friend and fellow OSS veteran, Hans Wynberg, O'Donnell decided to tell the story of
these men and others.
The book recounts the incredible courage and heroism of the "Jewish
Five" as Mayer and his friends are referred to in the book. These men
were Jewish refugees from the early days of the Nazi regime in Germany
who had escaped and come to the United States for a new life. When the
U.S. entered WWII each of them had enlisted to fight for their "adopted"
country. Because of their backgrounds and language skills, they were
recruited for the OSS to serve as spies behind the lines. The drama was
increased because the OSS teams included "volunteer" German soldiers.
These were "former" Prisoners of War who had deserted and surrendered,
or been captured by Allied forces in battle.
The accounts of the early OSS efforts to train the Jewish recruits and vet
the POWs for anti-Nazi sentiments are quite interesting. OSS Agent
Mayer could have died before his first mission when the OSS placed him
in a POW camp for three days to see if he could pass as a German soldier.
Mayer passed the test and identified a captured German officer named
Franz Weber who would be instrumental in his future mission as one of
the anti-Nazi volunteers for the OSS.
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O'Donnell decided he could not do justice to all the missions of the Jewish
Five in one book. He chose to concentrate this work on Fredrick Mayer
and Operation Greenup. The other agents and their missions fit into the
account as they touch upon Operation Greenup, and O'Donnell recounts
that each operation deserves to have its story told in a separate book. He
did include original mission reports in Appendices A through F, which
provide some insights into the activities of all the teams.
Many people are inclined to believe that all German citizens, except the
Jewish ones, in World War II were supporters of Adolph Hitler and the
Third Reich. It is clear from the accounts of the Jewish Five that a lot of
support for their activities was received not only from citizens, but even
from some elected officials and some of the criminal police or Kriminalpolizei. Of course by the point Operation Greenup was able to achieve
the greatest success, even some ardent Nazis with a pragmatic outlook
were willing to try to cut deals for a chance at lenient treatment when the
war ended. Mayer (and some others) was able to take great advantage of
this mindset and even after capture and torture he achieved great results
by using his wits. Through the assistance of the imaginative lies of one of
the "volunteer" POWs, Hermann Matull, Mayer managed to turn his
plight as a captured spy into a stunning success. The resulting events
saved lives that would have otherwise been lost in battles which would not
have changed the eventual outcome of the war.
Matull, who has vanished into the mists of history, was a German
deserter/con man/black marketeer, whose ability to spin stories would be
a huge advantage for any intelligence operative. He was well prepared for
his mission back into Germany and the OSS took tremendous pains to
equip him with documents and uniforms designed to pass close scrutiny.
His downfall and capture resulted from a minor oversight; Matull used
American cigarettes and matches in Germany. Another spy, Paul Krock,
was carrying forged German documents stamped with a round stamp. A
keen-eyed German NCO knew from his own service in the area represented that the stamp should have been square. These small errors
betrayed all the elaborate preparations for the spies to move about freely.
To compound the grievous situation, OSS Headquarters failed to recognize Matull was transmitting under duress even when he inserted extra
words in his messages as he had been trained to do in order to signal a
major problem. It is almost unbelievable that he was able to talk his way
out of execution and set the stage for Mayer to arrange the surrender of
Innsbruck.
Some may wonder what relevance this historical tribute could have to the
general field of espionage today. Certainly all of us have been conditioned
85

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 3

Journal of Strategic Security

through the years to believe we should "learn from our experiences" and
"not make the same mistake twice." Unfortunately, while many individuals internalize these concepts and profit from the lessons of life, too often
governments and other organizations seem doomed to repeat mistakes of
the past. History is valuable as a learning tool on a broad scale. The brief
examples of the failure to pay sufficient attention to small details such as
those which led to the capture of Matull and Krock are lessons which can
help better prepare agents for future missions.
In an even broader sense, the most important lessons of They Dared
Return may be in some questions today's practitioner might consider,
rather than explicit examples such as the failure to attend to the smallest
detail or the failure to recognize signs of a problem with an agent in distress. One lesson that springs to mind is the question of whether an
agency, or individual, is really "thinking outside the box." It is unclear
who originated the idea of recruiting Jewish personnel for these missions,
but the properly motivated and courageous men were located and volunteered. The "thinking outside the box" aspect of organizing the teams
occurred when someone conceived of the idea of also recruiting "desertervolunteers" from among the available captured enemy soldiers and vetting them to establish they could be entrusted with the sensitive task of
going back into Germany with the Jewish spies.
There is an even more strategic question one must consider in reading an
account of the efforts of these OSS agents. That question is whether
today's espionage efforts have a place for human intelligence. Have we
come to rely on modern technology at the expense of the effective utilization of human assets? If the current technology had been available more
than 65 years ago, would these dangerous missions have been sanctioned? Much more important—when reading the account of what these
men accomplished, one must ask if the exceptional results could have
possibly been achieved without the investment in human assets on the
ground? Obviously the networking, negotiations, and the exploitation of
enemy personnel weaknesses on the ground could not have been achieved
without face-to-face contact with the OSS agents.
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They Dared Return will appeal to the discerning reader as a historical
record of significant World War II actions, serving as a tribute to the heroism and dedication of OSS agents, former enemy soldiers, and some
individuals who remained within Nazi Germany during the war. The book
also has useful lessons and can motivate insightful questions, the answers
to which may impact our future direction in espionage activities.
Millard E. Moon, Ed.D., Colonel (ret.), U.S. Air Force Office of Special
Investigations
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